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The EU's Competence Gap in Public Health
and Non-Communicable Disease Policy
Oliver Bartlett
Abstract
The European Union (EU) has had a Treaty competence in the field of public health since
1993, however the slow development of this competence has not kept up with the rate at
which the EU's policy ambitions in public health have developed, especially in the field of
non-communicable disease (NCD) prevention. This has led the EU to rely on alternative
legal bases in order to realise these ambitions, leading to a 'competence gap' between the
legal bases that authorise EU action on NCD prevention and the policies the EU would like
to pursue.
This paper will explore, in three stages, how this competence gap might be addressed.
First, it will examine the arguments for and against giving the EU public health competences.
Second, it will analyse the EU's specific public health competence in Article 168 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the general internal market
harmonisation competence in Article 114 TFEU, in order to explore the precise boundaries
of each competence as legal bases for EU public health action. Third, it will explore the legal
relationship between Articles 168 and 114 and explain why, despite a more powerful specific
public health competence being a theoretically neat solution to the competence gap, the
likelihood of the EU being given increased public health powers is low.
Keywords
Public health, Non-communicable diseases, EU public health competences
1 Introdudion
Under the principle of conferral expressed in Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU), the European Union (EU or Union) must be able to identify specific
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powers or competences conferred upon it by the EU Treaties in order to adopt legal
acts.' If the EU cannot show that the power to adopt a legal act has been conferred
upon it, then, in accordance with Article 4 TEU, that competence remains with the
Member States. The EU has possessed powers to act in the field of public health
since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993.2 Article 129 EC TEU was
enacted to provide a modest complementary competence for the EU to encourage
cooperation between the Member States (...) and, if necessary, lend support to
their action' in the field of public health.3 This 'represented a compromise between
those governments of Member States who did not want any EU mandate in health,
and those who wanted to go further.
Even with no formal competence in the area, health concerns were part of EU
political activity. Health ministers had been meeting since the 1970s and several
European level public health programmes had already been set up-for example,
the Europe Against Cancer Programme. Thus, the granting of competence to
the EU might be viewed as either 'setting limits to the expansion of EU-level
activities in the public health field',6 or as 'little more than a formalization of earlier
arrangements. Either way, from the time that the Maastricht Treaty entered into
force onwards, the EU was to have a legal basis upon which to support the actions of
the Member States in public health. This competence was updated by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, yet, the new Article 152 EC was not substantively different from the
previous provision. The Treaty of Lisbon9 updated the competence again, however
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 (TEU).
2 Maastricht Treaty [1992] OJ C191/1 (later, the Maastricht Treaty became known formally as
the TEU).
3 TEU (n 1) art 129.
4 Tamara Hervey, 'Mapping the Contours of European Union Health Law and Policy' (2002)
8(1) European PL 69, 72.
5 Decision 88/351/EEC of the Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States of 21 June 1988 adopting a 1988 to 1989 plan of action for an information and public
awareness campaign in the context of the 'Europe against cancer' programme [1988] OJ
L160/52.
6 Hervey (n 4) 72.
7 Martin McKee and others, 'The Influence of European Law on National Health Policy' (1996)
6(4) J Eur Social Policy 263, 267.
8 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts [1997] OJ C340/1.
9 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community [2007] OJ C306/1.
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the latest version-Article 168 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU)'0oremains complementary.
Although the evolution of the EU's formal competence in public health has
therefore been slow, the evolution of its policy ambitions for public health has been
far more pronounced. This is particularly so when it comes to contributing to
the prevention of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). NCDs constitute one of
the most pressing public health challenges we face today-they account for 86%
of deaths in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region 2 and
63% globally.1 This has led to global recognition of the need for action, with the
World Health Assembly unanimously approving the Global Action Plan for the
Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 2013-2020.14 The EU has
followed suit, expressing the desire to 'accelerate progress on combatting unhealthy
lifestyle behaviours."
In this context, the complementary nature of the EU's public health
competence is often seen as a hindrance to these ambitions and alternative
legal bases are sought. This has created a rather uncomfortable and disjointed
relationship between the objectives of the EU with respect to NCD prevention, the
competences it possesses in public health, and the competences it actually uses to
realise these objectives. I refer to this situation as the EU's competence gap in public
health and NCD prevention.
In this paper, I will examine how this competence gap could be addressed. In
Section 2, I will examine the arguments for and against giving the EU competence
in public health in the first place. In Sections 3 and 4 respectively, I will analyse the
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ
C326/47 (TFEU).
11 See Scott Greer and others, 'Health Law and Policy in the European Union' (2013) 381 The
Lancet 1135.
12 WHO, 'Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Strategy for the Prevention and
Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 2012-2016' (WHO European Office 2012) EUR/
RC61/12, para 6.
13 Political Declaration of the UN high-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Prevention
and Control of Non-communicable Diseases (16 September 2011) A/66/L.1, para 14.
14 WHO, 'Draft action plan for the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases 2013-
2020' (6 May 2013) A66/9.
15 Council of the European Union, 'Council Conclusions on Closing Health Gaps within the
EU Through Concerted Action to Promote Healthy Lifestyle Behaviours' (9 December 2011)
2011/C359/05, para 9; for more information on the EUs NCD policy ambitions see: Alberto
Alemanno & Amandine Garde, 'The Emergence of an EU Lifestyle Policy: The Case of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets' (2013) 50(6) CML Rev 1745.
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EU's specific public health competence and its general internal market competence
in order to explore the precise boundaries of how each competence might be used
by the EU in order to fulfill its role in NCD prevention. In Section 5, I will examine
the legal relationship between these two competences and explain why, despite an
increase in specific competence being the theoretically neatest solution to the EU's
NCD competence gap, the likelihood of greater public health powers being given
to the EU is low.
2 Should the EU possess competence in public health?
It should not be taken for granted that the EU should be entitled to act in the field
of public health and NCD prevention. Seeking to alter the lifestyles and behaviours
of citizens is a controversial use of law-making power for any institution, especially
one such as the EU that functions on the basis of conferred powers. As such,
opinion is divided on whether the EU should have a public health competence at
all. This section will analyse arguments for and against the existence of EU public
health powers in order to explore why the EU should be entitled to participate in
NCD prevention.
2.1 Arguments against giving the EU powers to intervene in public health
Those who argue that the EU should have limited, if any, power to act in public
health do so with fair reason. Member States attempt to 'keep the EU out of a core
area of their welfare states' because they are unwilling to allow external interests
to influence sensitive national choices regarding how they look after the health
of their own nationals.16 After all, as the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) first set out in the case of Aragonesa, in the absence of harmonised rules,
and within the limits set by general principles of EU law, 'it is for the Member
States to decide on the degree of protection which they wish to afford to public
health and on the way in which that protection is to be achieved'. 7
16 Scott Greer, 'Uninvited Europeanization: Neofunctionalism and the EU in Health Policy'
(2006) 13(1) J Eur Public Policy 134, 135.
17 Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA and Publivia SAE v
Departamento de Sanidady Seguridad Social de la Generalitat de Cataluila [1991] ECR I-4179,
para 16.
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Several sensible concerns could be said to underlie this principle, for instance,
the fact that 'local culture and attitudes influence regulations. Many practices
that can lead to serious public health problems-for example, smoking, drinking,
the consumption of particular foods-are an intrinsic part of the vast majority of
western cultures. The CJEU has even acknowledged in its jurisprudence concerned
with alcohol that consumption of such products 'is linked to traditional social
practices and to local habits and customs', and that this will be liable to affect the
interaction of consumers with these products.' 9 Consequently, due to the diversity
between Member States in terms of 'the culture and tradition that affect private
,20
attitudes towards these types of lifestyle practices, different and specific pressures
on each Member State government will be generated regarding the extent to which
citizens approve of government intervention. In such situations, governments do
not want their ability to respond sensitively to cultural concerns circumscribed
by interference from outsiders who do not understand the particular cultural
dynamics at play. From this perspective, it is understandable that Member States
are uncomfortable allowing the EU to use its law-making power to intervene in
public health matters.
Member States are also unwilling to allow EU intervention in public health
due to the EU's perceived lack of institutional capacity properly to understand and
act on social concerns, such as public health issues. Such arguments build upon
the fact that the EU has 'for all its political importance, traditionally focussed on
essentially economic tasks, 2 ' and that its role in social matters, such as public health,
is 'weak and circumscribed'.22 This situation is both generated by, and illustrative
of, 'the member states' lack of interest in losing control over those aspects of
politics. 3 Beliefs that the EU, as a supranational organisation, lacks 'technical
expertise, a reputation for neutrality, superior skill and vision, greater legitimacy,
?24[and] consistently accurate political intelligence', have helped to entrench the
18 Marsha Echols, 'Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: Different
Cultures, Different Laws' (1998) 4 Columbia J Eur L 525, 525.
19 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products AB (GIP)
[2001] ECR I-1816, para 21.
20 Echols (n 18) 528.
21 Greer (n 16) 134.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht (Cornell UP 1998) 479.
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conviction that complex issues of public health should remain matters of national
politics. Most Member States particularly consider the European Commission, the
principal driver of EU policy, to be an inappropriate institution through which to
make public health policy. This might be due, for instance, to the Commission's
'absence of budgetary resources'2 5 in health, the fact that it is 'lacking the political
authority to provide effective leadership'26 in difficult social matters, and the fact that
27it is viewed as having 'limited expertise in the field of public health.2 Governments
are unwilling to hand over responsibility for the protection of the health of their
population to institutions that they feel are ill-equipped to serve their populations.
From this perspective also, it is understandable why Member States would not want
the EU intervening in public health.
2.2 Arguments for giving the EU powers to intervene in public health
While strong arguments exist for affording the EU limited or no power to act
in public health, there are stronger arguments that highlight the utility of the
participation of EU institutions in the discussion and formulation of public health
policy, and NCD policy in particular. I argue that these reasons justify affording the
EU public health powers. These arguments stem from the fact that several important
factors in NCD causation are cross-border issues. Stuckler and others note that the
leading root causes of NCDs are 'unhealthy commodities, their producers, and the
markets that power themt.28 These are all factors that have significant cross-border
elements and that no single Member State is able to solve.
Multinational corporations that produce products linked to NCDs are
,29
a critical factor driving the increase in NCDs. They act as 'vectors of disease
25 Wolfram Lamping and Monika Steffen, 'European Union and Health Policy: The "Chaordic"
Dynamics of Integration' (2009) 90(5) Social Science Q 1361, 1368.
26 Laura Cram, 'Calling the Tune Without Paying the Piper? Social Policy Regulation: The Role of
the Commission in European Community Social Policy' (1993) 21(2) Policy and Politics 135,
143.
27 Sebastiaan Princen and Mark Rhinard, 'Crashing and Creeping: Agenda-setting Dynamics in
the European Union' (2006) 13(7) J Eur Public Policy 1119, 1124.
28 David Stuckler and others, 'Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in
Increased Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol and
Tobacco' (2012) 9(6) PLOS Medicine e1001235, 7.
29 Anna Gilmore and others, 'Public Health, Corporations and the New Responsibility Deal:
Promoting Partnerships with Vectors of Disease?' (2011) 33(1) J Public Health 2, 2.
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through relentless marketing activities and insidious exercises of power that inhibit
policy efforts.30 These corporations are global entities, which make them seriously
powerful-their size means that they can generate more revenue, produce larger
marketing campaigns, manufacture more products, and act more consistently
across markets and jurisdictions.3' Importantly, the market dominance of
multinational alcohol, tobacco, fast food and other corporations means that they
are able to present unified arguments in global policy discussions, which appear
representative of their particular market segment, whereas groups of countries
may be divided on the issues at hand. Multinationals are able to use the collective
resources of the corporation in a bid to oppose national rules. They are even able
to infiltrate the highest levels of political discourse simultaneously across multiple
states. Such tactics are extremely difficult, in many cases impossible, for individual
states to tackle alone as they are executed at the supranational level. For an effective
response that will make a difference to NCD prevention, states must therefore meet
these challenges at the same level. This highlights the importance of involving
supranational organisations, such as the EU in public health policy.
Many of the products marketed by these corporations, particularly alcohol
32
and unhealthy foods, are still treated as ordinary tradable commodities. The way
in which such dual-natured commodities are allowed to circulate within markets
can serve to mitigate or exacerbate the risk that they pose to public health. At
present, as Sihto and colleagues note:
(...) rather than articulating how economic, industrial and trade policies could
contribute to the health and wellbeing of European citizens, health policies (...)
are scrutinized themselves in terms of their compliance with and contribution to
industry, trade and economic policies.
The way in which products are allowed to circulate within the European internal
market can have substantial consequences for Member State public health activities.
30 Rob Moodie and others, 'Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects of Tobacco,
Alcohol and Ultra-Processed Food and Drink Industries' (2013) 381 The Lancet 670, 672.
31 For examples in relation to the alcohol industry, see David Jernigan, 'The Global Alcohol
Industry: An Overview' (2009) 104 (Suppl. 1) Addiction 6.
32 See Thomas Babor and others, Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity: Research and Public Policy
(2nd edn, OUP 2010).
33 Marita Sihto and others, 'Principles and challenges of Health in All Policies' in Timo Stahl
and others (eds), Health in All Policies: Prospects and Potentials (Eur Observatory on Health
Systems and Policies 2006) 10.
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An example of this influence has recently been provided by the CJEU in its Scotch
Whisky Association judgment on the implementation of minimum unit pricing for
alcohol.3 4 The Court in that case suggested that minimum unit pricing strategies
pursuing a twofold objective of reducing alcohol consumption, specifically by
harmful and heavy drinkers and generally within the population, are contrary to
internal market law on the basis that less intrusive measures that attain the twofold
objective equally well are available.3 5 Thus, due to the commodification of products,
such as tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy foods, the Member States cannot avoid
the fact that the operation of the internal market for goods and services will have
an impact on the NCD prevention efforts within the Member States. The Member
States must therefore work alongside, rather than against, the EU on how best to
integrate health concerns into European level economic policy, if the operation of
the European internal market is to favour the reduction of NCDs rather than to
hinder it.
In summary, there are good arguments for and against affording the EU
powers to contribute to public health policy-making. Member States are justifiably
proud of their public health systems, are entitled to decide the level of protection
they would like to secure for their population and take decisions on public health
matters that affect their own nationals. However, when it comes to protecting the
public from the problem of NCDs, many of the issues facing governments do not
have causes that are specific to any one country's culture or traditions, do not
affect solely that country's nationals, and have implications that can be similarly
understood and experienced by every European. Therefore, to argue that the EU
should be kept out of public health policy-making and NCD prevention in particular
is to ignore the crucial transnational factors of NCD causation, which should be
addressed at a transnational level. It is necessary, even if not always desirable, for
the EU institutions to have some competence in public health so that they can fulfil
the role they are needed to play in coordinating the transnational level response
to NCDs in Europe. Having concluded that NCD prevention would benefit from
the involvement of the EU, the next section turns to address the manner in which
this involvement should be articulated. I will analyse the EU's current specific
competence in public health and its utility in NCD prevention, as well as how the
34 Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky Association and Others vLord Advocate and Advocate Generalfor
Scotland [2015] ECR I-1.
35 ibid para 50.
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EU's general competence to adopt rules on the functioning of the internal market
has been turned to NCD prevention purposes. Through this analysis, I will aim to
build a precise picture of the EU's abilities to act upon the role that it aims to, and
should, play in NCD prevention.
3 The EU's public health competence and its utility for NCD
prevention
As noted in the introduction to this piece, the EU has possessed competence
in the field of public health since 1993. This section will start by explaining
the complementary nature of this competence, and will proceed to analyse the
powers most relevant to NCD prevention. In doing so, I hope to explore exactly
how useful these powers can be to the EU.
3.1 The complementary nature of Article 168
The EU's current powers to act in the field of public health are contained in Article
168 TFEU, which is an area of complementary competence according to Article
6 TFEU. The nature of complementary competences was explored in 2002 by
Working Group V of the European Convention as part of the preparations for
drafting the Constitutional Treaty. They identified the nature of a complementary
competence (which they suggested should be renamed 'supporting measures') as:
(...) treaty provisions giving authority to the Union to adopt certain measures of
low intensity with respect to policies which continue to be the responsibility of the
Member States.36
This understanding of complementary competence may suggest that the scope for
strong action on NCDs under Article 168 is limited. Affording such a competence
to the EU seemingly confirms 'the primacy of the responsibility of the [M] ember
36 Final Report of Working Group V 'Complementary Competencies' (2002) CONV 375/1/02, 3
<http://european-convention.europa.eu/pdf/reg/en/02/cv00/cv00375-re01.enO2.pdf> accessed
2 March 2016.
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[S]tates in health care matters',7 and has led some to remark that '[t]here is very
limited room for manoeuvre in public health law at Union level. 8 However, I
argue the powers held by the Union in public health can still allow the adoption
of decisive and effective measures to stimulate the development of NCD policy in
Europe. The fact that measures flowing from a complementary competence are
of low intensity does not mean that they cannot be effective or indeed binding.
Furthermore, the fact that the EU cannot create common standards itself does not
mean that it cannot inspire others to create them.
3.2 Exploring the potential of Article 168(5) TFEU
Article 168(5) TFEU provides the most promising set of powers for future EU
action on NCDs. It reads:
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure (...) may also adopt incentive measures designed to protect
and improve human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border
health scourges (...) and measures which have as their direct objective the
protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, excluding
any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.3 9
This is 'the first explicit reference to tobacco and alcohol ever made in the
EU Treaties'.40 This reflects the fact that the EU should be taking on increased
responsibility for matters of NCD prevention to which it can contribute effectively.
Article 168(5) TFEU provides the EU with important powers that can help it to
achieve this. In order properly to understand the extent of these powers, three
interpretative tasks must be undertaken: first, unravelling what 'incentive measures'
are; second, establishing what constitutes a 'direct objective' of promoting public
health; and third, understanding what 'harmonisation' of the laws and regulation
of the Member States prohibits.
37 Sjef Gevers, 'Health Law in Europe: From the Present to the Future' (2008) 15 Eur J Health L
261, 268.
38 Andrea Faeh, 'Obesity in Europe: The Strategy of the European Union from a Public Health
Law Perspective' (2012) 19 Eur J Health L 69, 86.
39 TFEU (n 10) art 168(5).
40 Alemanno and Garde (n 15) 1760.
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3.2.1 Understanding 'incentive measures'
Imprecise drafting has resulted in the terms 'incentive measures' and 'measures'
both being used in Article 168(5) TFEU, although it is clear that, within this
particular provision, they refer to the same type of act. The preceding version,
Article 152(4)(c) of the Treaty of Nice used only the term 'incentive measures' and
excluded harmonisation.41 On the other hand, only the term 'measure' was used
42in provisions that did not exclude harmonisation. Thus, as Hervey and McHale
point out, 'measures' were supposed to include harmonising acts, while 'incentive
measures' were not.43 The distinction between the intensity of these two types
of legislative act has been maintained in the latest version of the public health
competence-Article 168(5), previously Article 152(4)(c) of the Treaty of Nice,
continues to refer first of all to incentive measures. Article 168(4)(a)-(c) TFEU
continues to refer to just 'measures' and, in fact, derogates from the complementary
nature of the public health competence imposed according to Article 2(5) TFEU,
in order to allow the possibility for harmonisation. Thus, the Treaty continues to
envisage two different intensities of action. The fact that in Article 168(5) both the
terms 'incentive measures' and 'measures' are used interchangeably is simply an
example of poor drafting-within Article 168(5) TFEU they both refer to the same
intensity of action.
Some argue that such incentive measures must be non-binding.44 Others
point out that, if adopted in the form of regulations or decisions, incentive
measures can be binding.45 As Grimonprez points out in the context of the EU's
complementary education competence in Article 165 TFEU, if the target of the
incentive is an actor within a state, then 'Member States may be obliged, first, to
adapt their legislation so that beneficiaries can satisfy the conditions [to obtain the
incentive] and, secondly, to take all other necessary implementing measures' that
46
are required in order to set up the incentive.
41 Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty of the European Union [2001] OJ C80/1.
42 Maastricht Treaty (n 2) art 152(4)(a) and (b).
43 Tamara Hervey and Jean McHale, Health Law and the European Union (CUP 2004) 79.
44 See, eg, Karen Heard-Laureote, 'Europeanization of Health Policy: The Role of EU Institutions'
in Charlotte Bretherton and Michael Mannin (eds), The Europeanization of European Politics
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 127.
45 Kris Grimonprez, 'The European Dimension in Citizenship Education: Unused Potential of
Article 165 TFEU' (2014) 39 Eur L Rev 3, 11.
46 ibid 12.
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This might be thought to conflict with the prohibition on harmonisation
of Member States' laws and regulations. Grimonprez explains that this is not the
case, though, because 'there is no pre-emption. Member States keep their basic
competence (...) but they have to exercise it in compliance with EU law containing
incentive measures. 7 Harmonisation involves the substitution of national policy
for European policy. Requiring Member States to comply with the imposition of
'procedural obligations to report within certain timeframes [or] provide information
within certain parameters,4 8 for example, involves no such substitution.
The convenience of using incentive measures compared to traditional
command and control legislation is also appealing to policy makers. For a start,
incentive measures are 'considered ethically less problematic than coercive
measures or threats',4 9 and thus are easier for policy-makers to justify in politically
sensitive fields. Non-binding incentive measures are also attractive when
negotiating policy in controversial areas for a number of further reasons, including
lower contracting and sovereignty costs, accommodation of diversity, flexibility,
speed and incrementalism.so
The variety of incentive measures available offers some potentially effective
ways of achieving policy goals. For example, take the strongest incentive of all-
money. Since 'public health will always turn on allocational decisions'," financial
incentives are likely to have a significant impact on how health concerns are
incorporated into policy design. EU level laws play 'a crucial role in legitimating
the disbursement of EU funding', and 'although the EU's budget is modest, the EU
institutions have traditionally used the provision of financial incentives to promote
the integration process. As McKee and others note, 'even if the term "incentive
measures" is interpreted as purely programmes designed to stimulate activity, if
47 ibid.
48 Tamara Hervey, 'The European Union and the Governance of Health Care' in Grdinne de
Burca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 2006) 179,
197.
49 Nancy Kass, 'An Ethics Framework For Public Health' (2001) 91(11) American J of Public
Health 1776, 1780.
50 For a good summary, see David Trubek and others, "'Soft Law", "Hard Law" and EU integration'
in Grdinne de Burca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US
(Hart 2006) 73-74.
51 Lawrence Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (University of California Press
2008) 493.
52 Hervey (n 47) 198.
53 ibid.
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these are accompanied by funds, as is likely, then national policies will inevitably be
influenced'.5 4 By using its own budget, and by leveraging 'the wealth of governing
institutions',55 the EU can act as a 'supranational policy entrepreneur to cultivate
shifts towards a particular idea',56 encouraging domestic actors to act as agents of
EU policy ambition.5 7 The creation of structures to manage such incentives could
be put in place under the powers granted by Article 168 TFEU.
Incentive measures could therefore be powerful tools for NCD policy, and
should not be underestimated. As Levitt and Dubner remind us, 'people respond to
incentives (...) Understanding the incentives of all the players in a given scenario
is a fundamental step in solving any problem'. Governments under political,
budgetary and time constraints are more likely voluntarily to adopt courses
of action that offer them appealing solutions for difficult situations, and well-
constructed incentive measures have the potential to achieve exactly this.
3.2.2 Understanding 'direct objective'
Article 168(5) TFEU provides authority to adopt 'measures which have as their
direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse
of alcohol' As yet, no case law on the interpretation of what constitutes a 'direct
objective' of NCD prevention has come before the CJEU. However, alternative case
law suggests that the phrase 'direct objective' allows acts to have a more substantial
impact on public health than merely facilitating more effective Member State laws.
In the ABNA case, the CJEU gave a ruling on several measures adopted in the
wake of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, which required more
detailed information on the labelling of animal foodstuffs. 59These measures were
justified under ex-Article 152(4)(b) of the Treaty of Nice, which allowed the EU
to adopt 'by way of derogation from Article 37, measures in the veterinary and
54 McKee and others (n 7) 266.
55 Hervey (n 48) 198.
56 Agnes Batory and Nicole Lindstrom, 'The Power of the Purse: Supranational Entrepreneurship,
Financial Incentives, and European Higher Education Policy' (2011) 24(2) Governance: An
Intl J of Policy, Administration and Institutions 311, 312.
57 For an example of how this has actually worked in the education context, with universities as
the agent of EU education policy, see ibid 313.
58 Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, Think Like a Freak (Penguin 2015) 106.
59 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C- 194/04 ABNA and Others v Productschap
Diervoeder [2005] ECR I-10468, para 5.
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phytosanitary fields which have as their direct objective the protection of public
health. The Court held that these measures did have as their direct objective the
protection of public health.
The process by which the Court arrived at this decision is instructive. The
above measures were adopted following pressure on the Union to do more to
prevent further outbreaks of BSE. The Court upheld their validity despite concerns
over the directness of the link to protecting public health,60 and despite the Directive
having been enacted against substantial opposition.61 Furthermore, the Court was
willing to accept that the contested provisions of the Directive did have as their
direct objective the protection of public health after merely examining the recitals
of the Directive, which set out the Union legislature's rationale for the contested
measures. This judgment therefore suggests that a similar margin of discretion
might be afforded in relation to whether certain aspects of alcohol and tobacco
control constitute direct objectives of public health-especially when the Union
legislature is facing similar intense pressure to do more in alcohol control. This may
afford the EU more independence in driving forward policy in the field of tobacco
and alcohol control than might have been suspected under a complementary
competence.
3.2.3 Understanding 'harmonisation' of the laws and regulations of the Member States
Two views exist on the precise meaning of'harmonisation The first is that '[Union]
legislation must not modify existing national public health legislation62 to the
extent that Union laws 'not merely displace but replace individual national political
choices'. In other words, any EU act that substitutes policy decisions made at
Member State level for those made at Union level is a harmonising act. The second
interpretation is that only 'de jureM harmonisation, which has as its direct purpose
60 See the concerns voiced by Davis J in the national court when the applicants originally applied
for judicial review of the national implementing legislation: R. (on the application ofABNA Ltd
and Others) v The Secretary of State for Health and another [2004] 2 CMLR 39, para 51.
61 See again the background to the adoption of the directive as summarised by Davis J (n 60)
paras 40-47.
62 Robert Schiltze, 'Cooperative Federalism Constitutionalised: The Emergence of
Complementary Competences in the EC Legal Order' (2006) 31(2) Eur L Rev 167, 181.
63 Michael Dougan, 'Legal Developments' (2010) 48 J Common Market Studies 163, 178
(emphasis added).
64 Schiltze, 'Cooperative Federalism Constitutionalised' (n 62) 181.
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the homogenisation of specific national rules, should count as harmonisation for the
purpose of competences that prohibit its use. Lenaerts has supported this position
in the context of the Union's competence in education, arguing that if a measure
has the 'indirect effect of harmonizing the content of teaching or the organization
of the educational system [it] does not necessarily mean that it conflicts with the
prohibition on harmonization65
The first, wider understanding of harmonisation is supported by case law. In
UK v Parliament and Council, the Court indicated that harmonisation should be
understood by the term 'measures for the approximation, as it is described in the
Treaties, and that the Union legislature has discretion 'as regards the harmonisation
technique most appropriate for achieving the desired result'.66 In view of this, we
should understand 'harmonisation' as a process that encompasses a variety of
methods of pre-empting national legislative initiative, all of which are intended
to fall within the prohibition in Article 168(5) TFEU. Consequently, it must be
concluded that the prohibition on harmonisation means that Article 168(5) TFEU
confers no authority upon the EU to engage in any type of NCD prevention that
would prevent the Member States from enacting their own policy on the same
topic.
3.3 Summary
The above analysis reveals that the specific public health competence contained in
Article 168(5) TFEU could be a useful and effective tool for enabling a wide range of
EU action on NCDs. It should be viewed as more than just an inhibition upon the
EU's ability to enact, command and control legislation. However, it is also clear that
Article 168(5) TFEU could not, in its current format, accommodate all of the EU's
ambitions in NCD policy, which do extend to European level standard-setting in
order to drive the pace of NCD prevention. Achieving this objective is made more
difficult by the fact that, no matter how many academic interpretations are proffered,
the definitive meaning of Article 168(5) will remain unclear until interpreted by the
CJEU. Ensuring that the EU can properly discharge the role that it is now required
65 Koen Lenaerts, 'Subsidiarity and Community Competence in the Field of Education' (1994) 1
Columbia J Eur L 1, 15.
66 Case C-66/04 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council of the European Union
[2005] ECR I-10574, para 45.
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to play in NCD prevention would not necessarily, however, 'require a new Treaty
67
provision' on public health. Alternative legal bases are available. The next section
therefore explores the use of the EU's general harmonising competence in Article
114 TFEU for just such a purpose.
4 The EU's internal market competence and its potential for use
in NCD prevention
Responses to cross-border NCD issues are most effective when taken by states
uniformly and simultaneously. In these circumstances, it would be advantageous
if the EU could harmonise national laws-a good example is the work that the
EU has already done in relation to cross-border tobacco advertising. However, the
EU's public health competence in Article 168 TFEU does not confer a power to
harmonise, so such powers must be found elsewhere in the Treaties if the EU is
to fulfil its role in NCD prevention. The suitable candidate to date has been the
EU's general competence to harmonise national laws for the purpose of ensuring
the functioning of the internal market, a power conferred by Article 114 TFEU as
follows:
The European Parliament and the Council shall (...) adopt the measures for the
approximation of the provisions laid down bylaw, regulation or administrative action
in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of
the internal market.68
Article 114 has already been used to bridge the EU's NCD competence gap, mainly
in tobacco control, with directives being adopted on Tobacco Products and
69Tobacco Advertising. In this section, I will explore how wide a bridge the EU
legislature has been permitted to build by the CJEU in its case law, and what future
applications this may have in NCD prevention.
67 Cristinela-lonela Velicu, 'Health Policy Governance in the EU: Composing a Jigsaw Puzzle?'
(2011) (Suppl. 3) EUROLIMES 171, 187.
68 TFEU (n 10) art 114(1).
69 Council Directive (EU) 2014/40 concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco
and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC [2014] OJ L127/1 and Council
Directive (EC) 2003/33 relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products [2003]
OJ L152/16.
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4.1 The use of Article 114 TFEU for public health purposes
The limits of the power conferred by Article 114 TFEU were first identified in a
public health case, the now infamous Tobacco Advertising saga. This subsection
will explain the test that was laid down, the consequences of how that test has been
applied, and how any potential checks on the expansion of the competence have
been side-lined by the Court.
4.1 .1 The test for recourse to Article 114 TFEU laid down in Tobacco Advertising
The competence in Article 114 is granted to the Union for the specific purpose of
building the internal market, and the Court has laid down certain conditions for
its use to ensure that this purpose is respected by the EU legislature. This occurred
in the Tobacco Advertising 1 case, in which Germany complained that ex-Article
100a EC, now Article 114 TFEU, provided insufficient competence for the adoption
of Directive 98/43/EC which sought to prohibit the advertising and sponsorship of
tobacco products in most media.
The Court in Tobacco Advertising 1 was keen to emphasise that the power in
Article 114 TFEU is granted specifically for internal market building, not internal
market regulation. It asserted in its judgment that:
To construe [Article 114] as meaning that it vests in the Community legislature a
general power to regulate the internal market would not only be contrary to the
express wording of the provisions cited above but would also be incompatible with
the principle (...) that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically
conferred on it.i 0
The Court went on to declare that, to be based on Article 114, a Union measure
must be'intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning
of the internal market'; must, 'genuinely have as its object the improvement of
the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market' ;72 and
must 'in fact [pursue] the objectives stated by the community legislature 73 Thus, in
70 Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2000]
ECR 1-8498 (Tobacco Advertising I), para 83.
71 ibid.
72 ibid para 84.
73 ibid para 85.
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order to rely on Article 114 TFEU, the Union legislature must show that a measure
is genuinely intended to, and in fact will, improve the conditions under which the
internal market functions.
The Court then added a number of qualifying statements to this test, both
in Tobacco Advertising 1 and the follow up case of Tobacco Advertising 2. These
included variously: that the exclusion of harmonisation in Article 168(5) TFEU
'does not mean that harmonising measures adopted on the basis of other provisions
of the Treaty cannot have any impact on the protection of human health' 74 ; that
'health requirements are to form a constituent part of the Community's other
policies'75 and that, provided the test for recourse to Article 114 TFEU is fulfilled,
'the Community legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis
on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be
made'?.76
These qualifying statements make it fairly easy to rely on Article 114 for a
purpose that is not in any meaningful sense connected to internal market building.
Their cumulative effect is that, as long as the positive conditions pertaining to
internal market building are fulfilled, a measure relying on Article 114 as its legal
basis may pursue any other objective it wants.
4.1.2 Erosion of the limits set by Tobacco Advertising test
This interpretation of the Tobacco Advertising test has been confirmed by its
application in a string of cases that have steadily eroded the apparent rigour of
the original test in Tobacco Advertising 1 to a 'threshold so apparently low and
potentially subjective as to no longer guarantee that a given proposal manifests any
meaningful and demonstrable connection to the internal market'. This process
will not be rehearsed in any detail here, having already been given thorough
treatment in the literature dedicated to this task.8 The essential outcome, though,
74 ibid para 78.
75 ibid.
76 ibid para 88.
77 Dougan (n 63) 177.
78 See, eg, Dougan (n 63); Stephen Weatherill, 'The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten
Years After Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Case Law Has Become a "Drafting Guide"'
(2011) 12 German LJ 827; Paul Craig, 'The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis'
(2011) 48 CML Rev 395.
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has been a drastic relaxation of the Court's inquiry into whether a proposed
measure actually removes any internal market barriers in practice. With each case,
the Court has become increasingly prepared 'to find some connection between
national disparities and the four freedoms so as to trigger Article 114, without too
close an inquiry as to the reality of the impact on those freedoms7 9 The effect of
this case law has been that, 'provided the drafting is well-chosen, the Court has
no plausible basis on which to set aside the legislative act'.80 On this basis, the EU
may benefit from the law-making powers in Article 114, yet is 'effectively free to
base both its desire to regulate, and the actual content of that regulation, upon the
pursuit of policy objectives extraneous to the establishment or functioning of the
internal market.
One might think that the primary line of defence against flagrant abuse
of this power should be the application of general principles of EU law, such as
proportionality and subsidiarity. However, as the analysis below will demonstrate,
diligent application of these principles by the Court to the exercise of competence
in Article 114 has also been sorely lacking. The Court's approach to Article 114 and
proportionality was first seen in the Swedish Match case, in which the Court upheld
the adoption of a total ban on the marketing of snus (an oral tobacco product)
under Article 114.82 The Court held that 'only if a measure adopted in this field is
manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective' can its legitimacy be called
into question.8 3 More recently, the Court has addressed the issue of proportionate
use of Article 114 in the Vodafone case, where Article 114 was the legal basis for
regulation on mobile phone roaming charges. Here, the CJEU admitted that it has:
accepted that in the exercise of the powers conferred on it the Community legislature
must be allowed a broad discretion in areas in which its action involves political,
economic or social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex
assessments and evaluations.
With this, the Court confirmed its choice to defer to the judgment of the Union
legislature on all political, economic or social decisions relating to why and how
79 Craig (n 78) 410.
80 Weatherill (n 78) 828.
81 Dougan (n 63) 177.
82 Case C-210/03 Swedish Match v Secretary of State for Health [2004] ECR 1-11900.
83 ibid para 48.
84 Case C-58/08 Vodafone v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
[2010] ECRI-5026, para 52.
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to use its harmonising powers, and the value of examining whether the actual
reasons for resorting to harmonisation are proportionate is all but eliminated. This
deference was confirmed even more recently by Advocate General Kokott in her
Opinion, delivered on 23 December 2015, on the challenge brought by Poland to
Directive 2014/40/EU, the revised Tobacco Products Directive. She emphasised
that 'legislative competence no longer plays such a central role as it previously did.
Interest is focussed on the question (...) of proportionality'.8 It is disappointing,
however, that she followed this up by reinforcing the Court's previous approach
by declaring '[t]hat discretion means that an infringement of the principle of
proportionality by the Union legislature can be taken to exist only where the EU
measure concerned is manifestly disproportionate'.86 Thus, the Union legislature
now seems to have a broad discretion in how to exercise its broad discretion, which
places very few limits indeed on the use of Article 114.
Turning to subsidiarity, since the subsidiarity review can be understood as an
enquiry into 'federal proportionality'8 -whether the Union has been proportionate
in assessing that the EU level will be the most effective for achieving the objectives
sought-there is reason to suspect that the Court's lax approach to substantive
proportionality in the context of Article 114 will be replicated in its approach to
federal proportionality. Vodafone again provides evidence that this is indeed the
case-the Court dedicates a mere two paragraphs to evaluating subsidiarity, and
in similar fashion to its proportionality analysis, tamely accepts the reasoning
put forward by the Union legislature in the contested Regulation itself. An actual
enquiry into the added value of action at Union level was not even attempted.
This weak approach to subsidiarity is again confirmed by Advocate General
Kokott. She writes that subsidiarity scrutiny 'is exercised primarily at political
,88level, with the participation of national parliaments. Therefore 'the Court can
reasonably review only whether the Union's political institutions have kept within
the limits of the discretion conferred on them in the exercise of their competences
,89in the light of the principle of subsidiarity.89 Thus, subsidiarity also constitutes few
real checks on the Union's use of Article 114.
85 Case C-358/14 Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2015]
ECLI:EU:C 2015:848, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 2.
86 ibid para 89 (emphasis in original).
87 Robert Schiltze, 'Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?' (2009)
68(3) CLJ 525, 533.
88 Case C-358/14, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott (n 84) para 146.
89 ibid para 147.
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Thus, Article 114 appears to have indeed become the general regulatory
power that the Court was so at pains to prevent it from becoming. To use my
earlier metaphor, as long as it uses the competence judiciously, there is now little
to stop the EU from using the tools provided by Article 114 to build bridges that
span the EU's NCD competence gap. Some would identify this development as an
unfortunate shift in the balance of regulatory power within the EU towards the
Union legislature. 90 I argue, though, that this can be seen as a positive result for NCD
policy. The EU is under a legal obligation to ensure that all of its policies should
contribute to public health protection, and that it has an increasingly important
role to play in tackling the transnational causes of NCDs. To date, the EU has not
always been able to fulfil these obligations. Through the judicial development of
the power in Article 114, the EU now finds itself in a position to change this. In the
last few paragraphs of this section, I therefore aim to explore ways in which Article
114 might be used in future NCD prevention activities.
4.2 Potential uses of Article 114 TFEU in NCD policy
One example of an effective NCD intervention is a ban on the marketing of products
that are causal factors for NCDs, whether this consists of bans on advertising,
point-of-sale display, or the sale of a product entirely.9' Advertising bans were of
course the subject of the Tobacco Advertising litigation itself, with the Court clearly
of the opinion, even before it set down its test, that '[in principle, therefore, a
Directive prohibiting the advertising of tobacco products in periodicals, magazines
and newspapers could be adopted on the basis of [Article 114] of the Treaty'. 92The
Court has also addressed more stringent marketing measures. In Swedish Match,
it stated plainly that 'requiring all the Member States to authorise the marketing
of the product or products concerned (...) or even provisionally or definitively
prohibiting the marketing of a product' 93 may be an appropriate response under
Article 114 to divergent national measures likely to result in trade obstacles. In
90 See Derrick Wyatt, 'Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market' in Michael
Dougan and Samantha Currie (eds), 50 Years of European Treaties (Hart 2009) 93.
91 For evidence and analysis on marketing and marketing interventions, see Oliver Bartlett and
Amandine Garde, 'Time to Seize the (Red) Bull by the Horns: the EU's Failure to Protect
Children from Alcohol and Unhealthy Food Marketing' (2013) 38(4) Eur L Rev 498.
92 Tobacco Advertising I (n 70) para 98.
93 Swedish Match (n 82) para 34.
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Alliance for Natural Health and Arnold Andrd the Court also upheld total marketing
bans adopted under Article 114.94 Consequently, the adoption of marketing
measures can be a legitimate exercise of Article 114. This line of case law may be
especially useful in advocating for more stringent regulation of alcohol advertising
by the EU where, as we saw above, there have been numerous calls for the EU
to intervene to a greater extent. The case law indicates that any product may be
the subject of advertising bans of varying intensity, as long as the conditions for
recourse to Article 114 are met and the general principles of EU law are complied
with. This suggests that the most pressing obstacle to more stringent EU action on
alcohol advertising will not be a lack of competence itself, but a lack of political
resolve to use the competence.
Further indications of the potential applications for Article 114 in NCD
policy are provided by the recent Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Poland v
Parliament and Council, where she stated that 'tak[ing] account separately of each
market segment regulated in an internal market harmonisation measure (...) must
be rejected. Instead, the relevant factor is whether the Directive as a whole may be
based on Article 114 TFEU'95 Her Opinion indicates that Article 114 may be used
to regulate a number of similar varieties of a particular class of product, while only
having to show the likelihood of divergences in national laws for the product class.
This may make it substantially easier to tackle novel product developments that
could present threats to public health, without having to spend time specifically
demonstrating the trade obstacle generated by each novel variant.
A final example ofwhere Article 114 could be useful to future NCD prevention
efforts is in the control of irresponsible practices by corporations. At present, it is
difficult formally to investigate and assess the behaviour of corporations that market
products such as alcohol and tobacco against international legal standards, such as
96
the right to health. The ability to set up conduct scrutiny authorities for such
purposes would undeniably be useful for NCD prevention efforts, and the Court
has again addressed the possibility of achieving this through Article 114, albeit not
in the context of public health. In the recent case of C-270/12 UKv Parliament,97 the
94 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others v Secretary of
State for Health [2005] ECR I-6485; Case C-434/02 Arnold Andr vLandrat des Kreises Herford
[2004] ECRI-11869.
95 Case C-358/14, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott (n 84) para 47.
96 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 art 12.
97 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom vEuropean Parliament [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.
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Court held that Article 114 supported the enactment of a Regulation that allocated
certain powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority that could be
used with regard to natural and legal persons. The Court stated that 'nothing in the
wording of Article 114 TFEU implies that the addressees of the measures adopted
by the EU legislature on the basis of that provision can only be Member States'.9 8
Thus, on the basis of this judgment, Article 114 could potentially be used to create
a corporate conduct scrutiny authority at the European level, which could monitor
the compliance of corporations with international legal standards, such as the right
to health, and which would then be empowered to initiate appropriate legal action
should a possible infringement be found.
4.3 Summary
In this section, I have attempted to show that the EU's internal market competence
can and has been used as a useful tool of EU NCD policy, enabling it to fulfil the
role that it is needed to play in NCD prevention when the powers in Article 168
TFEU prove insufficient. The use of the powers granted by Article 114 has, however,
provoked continued opposition from the Member States, showing that, although
this strategy is useful from a public health standpoint, it is politically controversial.
The final section of this piece discusses the relationship between Articles 114 and
168 in more detail, firstly asking how the use of one might be affected by the other,
and secondly, exploring the likelihood that the Member States will agree to expand
the scope of these powers.
5 Bridging the competence gap - the relationship between
Articles 168 and 114 TFEU and the likelihood of further EU public
health powers
This final section aims to argue that, while the EU can and should use both its
specific and general powers in tandem in order to fulfil its responsibilities in NCD
prevention, any hopes of expanding these competences in order to allow the EU to
play a larger role in NCD prevention are slim, due to the lack of political desire to
transfer any more powers to the EU in this sensitive social field.
98 ibid para 107.
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5.1 The textual relationship between Articles 168 and 114 TFEU
A reading of the text of the Treaty makes it clear that the EU's specific public
health competence and general harmonisation competence should both be
used in making public health policy. Article 168(1) provides that 'a high level of
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation
of all Union policies and activities',99 and Article 114(3) states that internal market
harmonisation proposals concerning health 'will take as a base a high level of
protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific
facts'. It is obvious, therefore, that the Treaties envisage that public health policy
will be advanced through the use of both measures, not just through the specific
public health competence. If this is the case, then we must understand the legal
relationship between the two provisions, so that they may be used together in an
effective way.
First, it is clear from case law that the exclusion of harmonisation in Article
168(5) applies only to use of the public health power in Article 168, and does not
apply to the exercise of other powers provided by the Treaties for public health
purposes. In Tobacco Advertising I, the Court clearly states that 'that provision
does not mean, however, that harmonising measures adopted on the basis of
other provisions of the Treaty cannot have any impact on the protection of human
health' 00 This point has been reinforced recently by Advocate General Kokott in
another Opinion on the revised Tobacco Products Directive, this time in Phillip
Morris Brands, where Advocate General has said that 'Directive 2014/40 is not a
public health measure, but an internal market harmonisation measure'.'0 ' Questions
of legitimacy over legislation adopted under Article 114 that has public health
effects cannot be answered by referring to the construction of other competences
in the Treaty. Clearly, then, the fact that the EU lacks harmonisation power for
public health purposes under Article 168(5) is not relevant to the question of how
the harmonisation power in Article 114 is used, and use of Article 114 for public
health purposes does not constitute unconstitutional circumvention of Article
99 (emphasis added).
100 Case C-380/03 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2006]
ECR I-11631, para 95.
101 Case C-547/14 Phillip Morris Brands and Others [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:853, Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, para 123.
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168(5), since the two provisions are to be analysed from the perspective of two
distinct mandates.
Second, it is clear that use of Article 114 for public health purposes does
not require any kind of prior authorisation under Article 168. The mainstreaming
provisions, cited regularly in case law on the use of Article 114, suggests that
the promotion of high levels of health in other policy areas must be sought
irrespective of what can and cannot be done under Article 168. For example, in
British American Tobacco the Court holds specifically that Article 114(3) 'explicitly
requires that, in achieving harmonisation, a high level of protection of human
health should be guaranteed'.0 2 Interestingly, Advocate General Kokott says in her
Opinion in Poland v Parliament and Council that 'the Union legislature had to be
allowed broad discretion in respect of the assessments underlying the Directive,
not least with regard to the measures which are best able to achieve the high level
of health protection'.103 She refers to Article 168(1) as authority for this statement,
suggesting that the mainstreaming obligation there even requires the EU to use
Article 114 in ways that will most effectively protect public health. It follows that
recourse to Article 114 for public health purposes may be sought solely on the
basis that use of the internal market competence is considered necessary to protect
health, without the need to seek prior authorisation or exhaust possibilities for
action under Article 168.
The legal relationship between Articles 168 and 114 is therefore such that
both powers may be used independently of each other in pursuit of public health
goals. Given then that either power may be used, yet Article 114 gives vastly more
power, should the EU favour use of Article 114 over Article 168 in the future? There
is little doubt that Article 114 TFEU offers considerable potential for developing
European-level NCD policy. Article 114 occupies 'a position of unusual strength
vis-hi-vis the other legal bases contained in the Treaties'1 0 4 and could potentially
undermine the principle of attributed powers as regards those policy fields where
dedicated Union competences are either weak or non-existent 05 This supposition
is certainly relevant in the case of public health. It is therefore only natural to
102 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002]
ECR 1-11550, para 62.
103 Case C-358/14, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott (n 84) para 88.
104 Dougan (n 63) 176.
105 ibid.
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question whether the allure of Article 114 will diminish the role of Article 168 in
the development of EU-level NCD policy.
Vague as it might be, though, Article 168 is not a weak competence. As I have
argued above, it has a key role to play in developing EU NCD policy-it is the only
dedicated power in public health matters that the EU possesses. Moreover, since,
as I will elaborate upon below, formal harmonising powers specifically for public
health are not yet on the table, the new governance mechanisms that Article 168
does authorise should be seen as important tools for the EU. We must remember
that, powerful as Article 114 is, it must ultimately remain tied in some way to
internal market-making, which means that it must be linked in some manner
to the free movement of goods, services, persons or capital. An internal market
dimension is not always a necessary or desirable feature of an effective NCD policy,
and there are important NCD causal factors that are unrelated to the operation
of the market. Article 168 provides the necessary power to be able to adopt any
measure or incentive measure that is directly relevant to protecting public health
against tobacco and excessive alcohol consumption, without having to tie in
secondary elements.
It would therefore be naive to dismiss the opportunities afforded by fuller
use of Article 168 simply because another way of demonstrating the competence
to harmonise in pursuit of public health goals exists. There is no doubt that Article
114 is a powerful competence, and that this is surely attractive to policymakers.
However, common standard setting is not always necessary for effective NCD policy,
and command and control regulation that lacks proper targeting is likely to be
ineffective and unpopular. Instead, we should aim to develop European-level NCD
policy using both Articles 168 and 114, matching the various objectives sought to
the most suitable powers to be found in either competence. It is acknowledged in
the NCD literature that 'only a multi-level approach, with mechanisms ensuring the
effective co-ordination between the different levels of intervention, will effectively
,106
reverse the current surge of NCDs 1-we need what both Articles 168 and Article
114 have to offer.
Having reached the above conclusions, the final question to ask in order to
draw together all of the analysis conducted thus far relates to the balance of the
relationship between Articles 168 and 114. For all the utility of both competences,
one cannot ignore that Article 168 offers much less power than Article 114. The last
section of this paper turns to examine the likelihood of the EU being able to secure
106 Alemanno and Garde (n 15) 1749.
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an increase in the public health power it already holds, to lessen the pressure that
is placed on the internal market competence.
5.2 Political feeling on the use of the EU's public health competences
Theoretically, the most elegant way in which to resolve the EU's NCD competence
gap is to transfer the legislative powers that the EU is already claiming for itself under
its internal market competence to the public health competence. Constitutionally
speaking, this would alleviate much controversy, as the EU would be using the
correct power for the correct purpose. This would take the form of a further
amendment to the Treaty, furnishing the Union with greater legislative powers
for the specific purpose of protecting public health. The analysis below explains,
though, why the Member States are unlikely to transfer any further public health
powers to the EU any time soon.
5.2.1 Differences in public health provision between the Member States
Practically speaking, it would be hard for the Member States ever to settle on an
agreement to transfer public health competences to the EU because it is difficult
to identify the precise responsibilities that should be transferred in the first place.
This issue is caused by significant differences in how the Member States conceive of
public health, how they provide for it, and how they finance it. Firstly, the Member
States understand 'public health' very differently. Kaiser and Mackenback have
conducted a survey of the use of the term 'public health' in eight EU Member States
and concluded that 'a consensus on either the organization of public health or public
health terminology is non-existent. Public health in Europe is characterized by the
diversity of concepts, systems and terminology'fo0 Their study shows that eight core
terms are used in varying frequencies and with various linguistic subtleties across
the eight Member States. For instance, the term 'health of populations' is used
108primarily in Sweden and the Netherlands, whereas 'health promotion' was one
of only two core terms that were universal to all countries.109 This diversity suggests
107 Sanja Kaiser and Johan Mackenbach, 'Public Health in Eight European Countries: An
International comparison of terminology' (2008) 122 Public Health 211, 211.
108 ibid 214.
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that it will be difficult for Member States to agree on what comprises 'public health'
powers, and consequently, even more difficult to agree on a concrete set of such
powers that should be transferred to the EU.
The Member States also differ considerably in their capacities for public health
provision. A review for the (then) Directorate-General for Health and Consumers
concluded that 'the capacity of some countries was much better developed than in
others'." 0 For example, while only two countries were found to lack administrative
units responsible for health promotion and disease prevention, seven states lacked
units with responsibility for addressing socio-economic factors of public health."'
This study suggests that the abilities of Member States to act effectively in public
health are different. We should therefore expect that States with more developed
public health systems will be reluctant to cede any significant level of control over
those systems to the EU if they feel that doing so would lower the level of protection
that they could offer their own citizens.
Finally, the Member States also spend different amounts of money on public
health. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development figures
from 2010 show that the percentage of Gross Domestic Product spent on health
ranged from 6% all the way up to 12%,112 reflecting the Member States' varying
levels of ability and desire to spend on health. This generates the opposite problem
to that which was indicated in the paragraph above-namely, giving further powers
to the EU would result in more common standard setting, which may put pressure
on some Member States with smaller health budgets. This will make those Member
States unwilling to consider transferring greater powers to the EU, as they may
feel that greater EU involvement in public health would force them to spend more
money on public health than they can afford.
Clearly, the differences between the Member States in how public health is
understood, provided for, and financed could make identifying and transferring
further public health powers to the Union a difficult exercise. Despite the more
flexible Treaty amendment procedure introduced at Lisbon, any revision requires
unanimous agreement between the Member States. In this situation, it is extremely
unlikely that all Member States would be able to agree on the nature of, and process
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by which, new powers should be added to Article 168. Even if further EU powers in
public health would go some way towards resolving the competence gap and that
this would, in turn, result in greater protection for the health of European citizens,
the level of effort required to procure unanimous agreement on what these powers
should be makes such an exercise distinctly unappealing to Member States. As a
result, political ambivalence has set in, the evidence of which I shall examine below.
5.2.2 Political ambivalence to greater EU involvement in public health
Political sentiment among the European political community is clearly against any
transfer of public health legislative power to the EU. With states so unwilling to
consider the issue, it is unlikely that enough momentum can be generated to force
a review of the EU's public health competence. An excellent case study is the wide-
ranging consultation exercise that the UK Government launched into the balance
of competences between the UK and the EU." 3 These reviews were conducted
across a range of sectors, and the review conducted in the health sector reveals a
significant amount about the UK Government's attitude towards EU competences
in the field of health. The published results of the Health Review explicitly state that
whilst supportive of EU work on public health in general and certain voluntary
initiatives, the UK Government believes that the current balance of competence is
broadly appropriate and therefore does not need to extend further'11 4 The report
was equally conclusive on the attitudes of the (primarily) UK-based stakeholders
who responded to the consultation. Although 'stakeholders strongly supported
more input from the EU on public health"' the consultation found that 'most
would prefer to see progress under existing competence?1 6 This shows that, in the
UK at least, there is little appetite for a large transfer of public health competence
to the EU, but rather, for increased effort on the part of the EU under its existing
competences.
The absence of any desire for significant revision of the EU's public health
competence is also evident from the consistency of attitudes expressed by the
113 See the announcement by Foreign Secretary William Hague at HC Deb 12 July 2012, vol 548,
cols 468-70.
114 Department of Health, Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the European
Union: Health (Department of Health 2013) 8.
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holders of the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers. In 2000, the
French presidency indicated in its priorities for public health that it would like
to encourage 'closer cooperation between the Member States, with the support
of the Commission'." 7 This view, given some three years after Article 152 EC had
been adopted, indicates satisfaction with the complementary nature of the revised
competence, and a desire for the EU to continue to play a supporting role. Some
15 years later, the attitude of Member States seems not to have changed. In a recent
speech to a meeting of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and
Food Safety, the Latvian health minister set out the public health priorities of
the incoming Latvian Presidency. In that speech were some revealing comments
on EU competence. He specifically mentioned that alcohol policy 'remains the
competence of the Member States'." 8 More generally, he remarked that health 'falls
within the purview of the Member States'." 9 Consequently, it appears that, even
after 15 years of progressive public health action by the EU in the 21st century, there
is still limited appetite amongst the Member States for updating the EU's formal
public health competence.
Even within the EU institutions there is ambivalence towards a transfer of
public health powers. For example, a 2011 European Parliament motion calling
for more action on health inequalitiesl2 does not once mention the possibility of
updating the EU's public health competence, even though various actions in public
health were advocated that might benefit from an increase in EU competence,
including a 'call on the Commission to mainstream an approach based on the
economic and environmental determinants of health'.' 2 ' Instead, there are various
calls for the EU institutions to play supporting roles, for instance, a call 'on the
Commission to support actions financed under the current and future Public
Health Action Plans to address the social determinants of health'. Given the
minimal desire within even the European Parliament to initiate debate on
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competence reform in public health, it is difficult to see where large-scale political
momentum would come from for initiating a serious review of the EU's public
health competence.
In summary, political feeling is that the current powers of the EU in public
health are sufficient, and that greater and more effective use should be made of
the specific complementary competence already conferred upon the EU in public
health. If this much was not clear from remarks in political discourse, it is certainly
obvious from the recent legal challenges to the EU's revised Tobacco Products
Directive-adopted under Article 114-on the grounds of lack of competence,
which were examined above. This actually leaves the EU in a slightly awkward
position since the EU's specific competence might still be considered too vague to
allow the EU to step up its involvement in public health as desired by the political
community. With the Member States unwilling to extend, or perhaps even to clarify,
the powers in Article 168, the EU will continue to experience a conflict between its
powers and its ambitions in NCD policy, and will continue to have reason to turn,
not to Article 168, but to Article 114. Thus, the competence gap between the EU's
ambitions and its powers in public health looks set to be maintained.
6 Concluding remarks
There are strong reasons why the EU should be involved in the fight against NCDs.
The transnational nature of many of their most important root causes means that
there must be some form of transnational response, and the EU is well placed to
coordinate and perhaps at times even lead this response. The competences given to
the EU in order to carry out this role provide a considerable amount of law-making
power. They are not, however, without their weaknesses and vagaries. Despite
the potential of Article 168, its already well-known limits as a complementary
competence remain, as do uncertainties surrounding the newly added powers on
tobacco and alcohol. Where these limits are reached, Article 114 TFEU provides
the necessary authority for the EU to drive NCD policy forward. However, as recent
case law demonstrates, the appropriateness of this strategy is still highly contested
and thus, still politically challenging to employ.
It is evident, though, that the Member States would find it difficult to agree
upon how to establish a stronger legal basis from which the EU could pursue its
ambitions in NCD prevention, or at least, to clarify the ambiguities in its current
legal basis for public health. This is disappointing, as effort expended now in order
to clarify exactly what the EU should and should not be doing in NCD prevention
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may prevent the competence gap from becoming any more unstable. At present,
realising the potential of Article 168 would still not be enough to accommodate the
EU's ambitions in NCD prevention. The EU is clearly not afraid to use Article 114
in order to bridge this gap, and nor should it be, as the internal market competence
offers a legitimate outlet that enables the EU to play its part in the multi-level
approach that is required for effective NCD prevention. However, as long as the
EU is willing to use Article 114 in this manner, it seems from the proliferation of
case law that one or more Member States will always be willing to challenge such
use. This pattern surely cannot be sustainable. The outcome of the next challenge
may do more to upset the balance of competence between the Member States and
the EU than if the Member States made the effort required clearly to establish the
specific powers that the EU needs in order freely to play its part in NCD prevention.
If we are to expect the Member States to make efforts to resolve the current
competence gap, the EU must first make efforts to demonstrate that it still exists.
Thus, the first step must be for the EU to answer the calls of the Member States (and
others) for more effective action in key areas of NCD prevention, making full and
effective use of Article 168, which still holds untapped potential for European level
NCD policy. Only then will it be possible to demonstrate the necessity of albeit
carefully limited, public health harmonisation powers that will enable the EU to
fulfil its role in the field of NCD prevention.
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